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Welcome to Philosophy Podcast where we interview leading philosophers about their recent books. Today I'm speaking to Professor Karin de Boer about her book Kant's Reform of Metaphysics: The Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered. And a couple of endorsements, this is from Paul Franks, Yale University. De Boer has succeeded in writing a much-needed account of Kant's critical philosophy as the salvation not the destruction of metaphysics, correcting the epistemological focus of over a century of Kant's scholarship. Her illuminating rereading in light of the metaphysics of Wolff and Baumgarten, and her scrupulous reconstruction of the system of pure reason that Kant intended but never completed, make this book essential reading for anybody interested in Kant's philosophy.

And Carl Aric of University of Notre Dame. De Boer shows in detail how Kant's critical aim was to reform metaphysics as a system, not to reject it altogether, and especially valuable feature of her discussion is its focus on Conant concern with Wolf's philosophy and the metaphysical question of how metaphysics as a science and pure reason is possible at all. Yeah. Karen Dubbo is the author of Thinking in the Light of Time, Heidegger's Encounter with Hagle also on Hagle the Sway of the Negative. She also co-edited with Tinka Prenaya [inaudible 00:01:49] , the Experiential Turn in 18th century German philosophy. Professor Karen De is professor philosophy at the University of Lu van in Belgium. Welcome to Philosophy podcast. So tell me, when I read those endorsements, they talked about you're having a different interpretation and something about epistemology having been dominant before and you're emphasizing something else. Could you give us an overview of that?

 

Speaker 2:

Yes, sure. So maybe I can clarify the take on the reason that I developed, starting from a very simple example, namely the principle of causality. So the concept and the principle of causality are very often used to clarify Kant's project, but I think that has an interest in this concept and in other concepts that is maybe somewhat different from what we take it to be. So normally we would consider Kant be interested in the concept of causality because causality is seen as a principle that makes possible our empirical judgments about, for instance, colliding billiard balls. So that would be an interest in the concept of causality. That has to do with the way we acquire knowledge of things. So that could be called the epistemological approach. So as I just said, I think that Kant was interested in the concept of causality also for a different reason because he noticed that his predecessors and contemporaries also used the concept of causality to make statements about gods.

Yes. For instance, by positing, by arguing that God is the cause of the universe. And for Kant, this was a very problematic statement. Yes. Because in fact, what the meta physicians were doing on his account was just combining two concepts, but there was no bearing to actual empirical cognitions. And as you probably know, yum had a similar criticism. Yes. Yum also thought that it was very problematic to speculate about God and to claim that God is the cause of the universe. And as is well known, Kant took Yum's skepticism in this regard extremely seriously, but Kant thought that we could not just get rid of metaphysics in the way Yum proposed. Because according to Kant, it was really important to conceive of causality as a pure concept. That is to say as a concept that is part and parcel of the hardware as it were of the human mind that is not just a concept such as all kind of empirical concepts that we develop through experience.

So Kant wanted to preserve the concept of causality as an absolutely necessary concept because he thought that only in this way can we account, as it were for the objectivity of our empirical knowledge. So I think that if we only think about Kant's project as a project that is interested in causality in relation to empirical knowledge, we miss, as it were, the other part of the story, namely Kant's concern with the use of the concept of causality in a speculative metaphysics. In my book, I tried to shift the focus from the parts on let's say the conditions for empirical cognition to the part where Kant develops his criticism of former metaphysics. But unlike many other authors, I take this criticism of former metaphysics to as it'll motivate the project as a whole. And so I take count also in the early parts of the work, including the transcendental deduction, to be concerned with the limits within which the concept of causality can be used. I hope that this is clear.

 

Speaker 1:

And as opposed to Hume, he's not trying to get rid of metaphysics, he's trying to reform it. But it is a limitation, isn't it? Or perhaps you don't think of it that way.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. I take reform of metaphysics to indeed consist in a limitation of metaphysics, yes? So what he opposes, what he rejects, as I already mentioned, the tendency of metaphysics to speculate about God, the soul, or the world as a whole, completely divorced from the realm of possible experience. That is something that Kant rejects, at least with regard to our theoretical cognition. But he thinks that metaphysic still has a really important task, namely to identify all a prioritized concepts as he calls them. That is to say all concepts that have their origin in the human mind per se. So he takes this to be an important task for metaphysics that needs to be preserved also within the modern context.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. And so you speak of him having an inner end in the text, which is this system of pure reason. That would be what metaphysics will look like in his mind. And you describe it, or maybe it's a translation of German, it's an inventory, it's a list of, it's limited. It's not about God or the world or the soul as such. And instead it's a inventory, I think of it. Tell me how you think of it as a list of synthetic statements.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. That that's partly correct. So in fact, already develops a small version of this system within the critique of pure region itself, yes? Most importantly, he puts forward the famous table of categories, which is just a list or invent of 12 basic concepts that according to Kant as it were necessary, piece of positions of any cognition that we can achieve of any knowledge that we can achieve. So we find in the critique itself already a minimal system. And I think that ambition was to increase this system, and that is to say to also deal with more specific concepts that are not presuppositions of any knowledge whatsoever, but for instance, are necessary presuppositions or principles for the actual natural sciences. Instance, a concept such as force or movement should also be included in the lists.

These concepts are not yet presented systematically within the context of the critique of pure reason itself. But accordance to Kant all particular sciences share, as it were, the basic conceptual framework already presented in a critique of your reason. But they also are based on a set of specific principles that is to say principles that are specific to, for instance, physics or psychology or any other discipline.

 

Speaker 1:

I think you described that there was this distinction I thought was helpful between maybe he started out in the role of judge, but along the way took on the role of architect or designer one might say. Could you explain that? I thought that was helpful.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. I think this is indeed an important distinction because it pertains to the two separate tasks that Kant tries to carry out in a single book. Maybe this is not something that we should advise our students yet to identify two tasks and carry them out simultaneously. Because it stuff gets very complicated. So maybe it would be preferable to do the first thing first and then move on to the other task. But I think that for Kant, this was impossible. So what are these two tasks? Maybe I start with the task of the architect, and this I think is something we have already discussed, yes? Namely providing a systematic account of all the pure elements of our actual cognition. That is to say the concepts and principles that are necessarily presupposed in our actual knowledge of objects. So the accounts in his capacity as an architect is concerned with presenting the various lists of concepts in a systematic manner. And Kant thought that his predecessors in Germany had already done this to some extent, but hadn't done a proper job.

 

Speaker 1:

And they... Go ahead. Right.

 

Speaker 2:

So maybe I can first move to the other task, the task of the judge. And this is something that Kant emphasizes in the prefaces, namely the need to, as it were, step back from the work of the architect and to investigate how metaphysics can be established as a science in the first place. And in order to answer this question, the classical task of providing a systematic account of all these aporia elements must be interrupted in order to ask a more fundamental question.

That is the question, what are the ultimate conditions of metaphysics itself as a discipline? So in this case, we are not interested in the conditions of physics or empirical cognition more generally, but in this case, we are interested in the conditions that make it possible to do metaphysics in the first place in an adequate manner. And I take it that Kant uses the metaphor of the judge to explain this part of the word. The second task, as it were. So the judge doesn't do anything but assesses the various claims that have been made by meta physicians, but also by the skeptics. And the judge assesses, as it were, the validity or lack of validity of the various claims that has had been made.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. And I thought one of the really interesting distinctions was what Kant is doing is restricting not individuals, but the discipline of metaphysics, in other words. Well, maybe you could elaborate on that. It's not a restriction on what people will do. It's a restriction on what the field of medic physics should do.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes, exactly. Well, I think that the term individual is maybe not sufficiently specific because individuals can be engaged in all endeavors. I think I can answer your question by looking in particular at what individual scientists do, yes? For instance, when they are engaged in physics. Now on my reading, the scientists who actually engage in empirical research, they are not limited whatsoever, yes? They can go on with the investigations indefinitely. Kant doesn't really put a limit on the activities carried out by the scientists. And maybe this is not sufficiently appreciated by scholars. That in that regard there's no reason for the scientist to be modest. Kant's philosophy is often associated with a requirement to be modest, yes? I don't think this is correct because I think that Kant is, as you just mentioned, is interested in the existing tendency of metaphysics to go beyond any bounds. And he wants to restrict metaphysics. Such that it takes upon itself a mother staff, namely systematically organizing these various aporia elements of our knowledge.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. I think that the quote I had was the restriction is imposed not on the human mind as such, but on the field of metaphysics, because isn't there the sense that humans not, instead of looking at professional philosophers, look at everyone, we're going to naturally do metaphysics in our head. And it's not my understanding of what you're saying is he's not saying there's anything wrong with that. He's saying in the field of metaphysics, it should be restricted. Is that the way you see it?

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah. Yes. That's the way I see it. And I think that Kant would also affirm that it's perfectly fine for human beings and perfectly purposeful in at least a number of cases. For instance, to believe in God. What you believe in immortality of the soul. So Kant is not against human beings who believe in God or in the immortality of the soul because his concern is the action supportive or not. If it's supports individuals in having a certain hope, or if it supports them in acting morally, then believing in god's or in immortality of the soul is perfectly fine. So again, this I think illustrates that Kant was not interested in delimiting human cognition and human activity in general. No, he investigates human cognition and human action for the purpose or for the sake of clarifying what the limits are of the traditional type of metaphysics.

 

Speaker 1:

Maybe what is getting confused for people is this idea that there is Kant saying that there is this nominal realm, but we can have no access to it. That's not to say that we can't have synthetic truths, but there is this realm out there that we're not going to be able to tap. That is the source maybe of this idea that he is all crushing.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. That is indeed an important point and has also been an important bone of contention in the literature. Now, my way of looking at this is as follows. I think that we should first of all get rid of the expression there is that you used. Yes. You say you-

 

Speaker 1:

There is a nominal realm.

 

Speaker 2:

There is a nominal realm, and I don't think that Kant would normally use this expression. And more generally, I think it is being used way too often in philosophy. One thing I learned from Kant is that there is expression or question is relevant to philosophy,

 

Speaker 1:

Right.

 

Speaker 2:

Or at least to the type of philosophy that Kant's is doing. Yes. So Kant doesn't posit that there is this realm outside of us, to which we don't have any access. But he tries to clarify, as it were, from within his investigation of the human mind, how we can on the one hand engage in unifying our appearances. That is to say how we can produce empirical knowledge, on the one hand, but how on the other hand, the human mind is also able to produce ideas such as the idea of God or the idea of the soul. So he's not positing anything, he's just, as it were, clarifying how the human mind operates, how it can operate on stuff out there or stuff that we get access to through our senses. But how your mind can also operate in a different manner and produce the idea of God, the idea of the soul, the idea of freedom, et cetera. And so Kant then further reflects on this distinction just on the two directions that we can take in so far as we try to think about things.

 

Speaker 1:

No, I understand. That's very helpful. I think one of the things you observe is that the project, his lifelong pursuit was to turn metaphysics into a science or to reform metaphysics by turning it into a science. And so all those words need some help there. But what was metaphysics like at his time, supposed to now, and I wondered if you could give some concrete examples of what was wrong with metaphysics at the time. Any theories out there that he thought were really harmful or?

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah, there were several problems that he identified. I have already discussed one earlier on in this conversation, namely the tendency of meta physicians to make judgments such as God is the cause of the universe.

 

Speaker 1:

Okay. Yeah. Gotcha.

 

Speaker 2:

And in this, the judgment looks very similar to an empirical judgment such as the swan is white. Or this movement is the cause of the second movement, right? The structure of these judgments is very similar, but Kant thinks that the judgment about God is basically elusory. It's just a combination of two concepts, but in the way the concepts are being combined, no real object is being generated. So there is an emptiness to this judgments, which is not acknowledged by the meta physicians. Because they took their judgment about God, for instance, to be the pinnacle of metaphysics.

So this is something that we already discussed, but there is an other problem that really bothered Kant and that he tried to solve and that is somewhat related to this one. And so the other one concerns the discipline of cosmology and cosmology was considered to be a part of metaphysics that was very different from actual physics. And that consisted in a number of speculations about the world as such. But of course, we cannot observe the world as such, or the world as a whole. We only can observe bits and pieces of the world, but many of Kant's predecessors and even contemporaries, they debated about questions concerning, for instance, Monas. Yes, of course this is an idea that they took over from lightness, but they had very heavy and animated debates about whether a Mona takes up space.

So how can we know whether a Mona takes up space just cause Mona by definition cannot be perceived by the census. So these debates and controversies about Mona, for instance, were really focal, very problematic. And I guess that he was also personally irritated by these books and articles where these controversies were discussed. And he probably also got irritated by his own earlier attempts to contribute to these debates. So the critique of pure reason is in a way also a critique of Kant's own earlier position. And so he developed his ideas and emancipated himself, at least to some extent from his earlier assumptions, which were more or less the [inaudible 00:23:23] ones.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. And so is it fair to say that on the epistemological front, which maybe has been the focus, Kant was responding to Hume who was saying we couldn't really know much, but on the metaphysical, I think you also point out that the terms metaphysical and epistemological would not have been Kant's terms. But anyway, on the side that you're emphasizing, he was saying humor was wrong because he was too limiting, and the meta physicians were need to be reigned in because they are too expansive or have too much flying too high.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes, exactly. Yeah.

 

Speaker 1:

I think one of the things I think it's very appealing about this idea is that there is this... Okay, so in one sense he was in the critique of pure reason. He was going about doing this second order critique, but along the way you have much of this general metaphysics. But in the other sense, it was never something that he actually finished or never really wrote a second, wrote this all up, I guess you could say. And it gives you this sense of this lost manuscript or this unwritten manuscript, which is really intriguing because you want to know what it would say, but why was it not ever finished by him or anyone else?

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah. Okay. That's a good question. Yeah. So in the final chapter of my book, I tried to provide an outline of consistent by dealing with the various main parts and also filling in some of the details to the extent that I could do so relying on his lectures on sections of the critique of your reason itself.

 

Speaker 1:

Letters of the people.

 

Speaker 2:

So for me, this has been important because in this way I think I could provide a different vantage point from which we can, as it were, reassess the whole project. Yes. The critical part and the aim that Kant had set himself. So that I think is the relevance of this final chapter. Not so much because we now know exactly what Kant had in mind with his future system or his future metaphysics, but because it allows us to put into perspective as it were, what he actually did in the critical pure reason. So that that's maybe one part of the answer. The other part of the question is, well why didn't Kant go on and actually sit down to write this system of pure reason or metaphysical system that he promised at various points in the text? And there I think we can only speculate yes, and just said Kant was not really in favor of speculations, but as readers and writers, we can not avoid engaging in a little bit of speculation from time to time.

So as you know, Kant felt that he had to carry out a number of other tasks after the critique of pure reason. No, he went on to write two more critiques and he went on to write a number of other works as well. And as I also suggest in the book, I think that Kant in a way lost interest in this metaphysical system. And as he took almost 10 years to write the critical, so it is very possible that the aim he set himself, let's say the late 1770s, had maybe lost some of its appeal once he had finished at the time he had finished the book. And it's also possible that he realized gradually that carrying out the task of the architects in a full-fledged manner would be more complicated. Then he had suggested in the critique of pure reason, so it could be a combination of both that he felt that other tasks were more pertinent. And maybe he was also somewhat discouraged because he realized that the task of the architect was more complicated than he had thought.

 

Speaker 1:

Well, I'll speculate also, but this is just from reading your book, that it seemed like he thought maybe this was something for a student or someone an heir to do that that was not really his forte. That was my only read on it.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. So these passages where he basically suggests that his students and followers could easily carry out the work they suggest that Kant was very optimistic about the possibility of writing up a metaphysical system.

 

Speaker 1:

Just write it up.

 

Speaker 2:

Just write it up. But as I just said, it's possible that after the publication of the critique reason, Kant gradually realized the obstacles that might be in the way of a satisfactory elaboration of the metaphysical system. Now, what I did not really discuss at length in the book is the fact that some of Kant's students took his message to heart and did try to elaborate a meta fiscal system. And after I published my book on country reform, I wrote an article on Schmid who was not exactly Kant's student but someone who very early on started teaching a concept of reason in [inaudible 00:28:59].

 

Speaker 1:

Interesting.

 

Speaker 2:

And the book chapter is not yet published. But I thought it was really fascinating to see how someone at the time, based on Kant's own indications and some thinking to do the job, and maybe it's not very satisfactory, but at least I think it's of interest for story philosophy to see that there was something going on with regard to this idea of a philosophical system in between [inaudible 00:29:34] on the one hand, and for instance, Reinhold and Fester and Hagle on the other hand. Because the German idealists also had this ambition to develop an encompassing philosophical system, not call it metaphysics, but in fact there is a lot of continuity between the idea of a metaphysical system if you look at what Kant has to say about it. And if you look at what Fester and Hagle, et cetera have to say about it. But as said, I was really fascinated by this attempt, by this unknown figure called Schmidt to develop a metaphysical system on the basis of Kant's own indications.

 

Speaker 1:

Especially since you had just thought about how you thought it would look.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes.

 

Speaker 1:

How accurate you think, well, I mean it's just one person, but were there.

 

Speaker 2:

Well maybe someone can compare my chapter.

 

Speaker 1:

That's a good point.

 

Speaker 2:

And what I have to say about at some point in time.

 

Speaker 1:

So the emphasis by Kant was trying to make this more scientific turn, metaphysics into a science, science must have meant something or I don't, whatever the German word was it even that word meant something different at that time than now. How is this new metaphysics that he envisions, how would it be scientific as opposed what about it is scientific?

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah, that's as well a very good point. So the German term is vision shaft. I don't know if that's helpful.

 

Speaker 1:

No, I do remember that.

 

Speaker 2:

Ask the question. No, but let me try to explain a bit more about-

 

Speaker 1:

My main question is, I guess is it about the method you use to arrive at your results? Or is it about scientific means it's something that the end result is what we can call knowledge? Those are two options I can see. Because people often, when you hear science, you immediately hear the word method. And so is he saying that what's different is that he wants to use a new method? That was that's where I'm leading.

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah. Okay. So I think that's a good point. Yes. And I think that indeed for Kant the method is really, really very important. And so I think that we can understand what he means by science and scientific, if we contrast his own ideas with what he took to be Wolf's project. So basically the metaphysics that emerged from Mitch Metaphysics, and that was incredibly influential during the first half of the 18th century. So seen from Kant's perspective, Wolf was not able to turn metaphysic into a science for various reasons. But one of the reasons was that according to Kant, Wolf did not proceed systematically. So for instance, in Kant's, sorry, involves general metaphysics, we find a whole list of basic concepts such as causality and substance and possibility and necessity and ground and so on. Yes, these well-known concepts now Kant was not satisfied with this metaphysics because it was just because Wolf in his view, was just listing these various concepts but not developing the account in the systematic manner.

And so we can compare these two Kant's own micro system within the critique of pure that I already mentioned, namely the table of categories. 12 categories ranged under three, four headings. It looks really nice and elegant and ant also asserts that the table of category is developed from a principle. Yeah. He's not very clear on this. And as well has caused great discussions among his contemporaries and also later commentators, but at least count himself held that his table of categories was developed strictly, systematically. And he thought this was a great improvement compared to the arbitrary collection of concepts that we find involves first part of the metaphysics. And so I think that for Kant's Sentaficity is basically the same as Systematicity. Okay. That's helpful. And of course, in order to proceed systematically, you need to have a method that allows you to proceed systematically.

So for Kant's, the notion of a science does not necessarily mean that there has to be a true relationship between my thoughts and the object of thoughts. So the correspondence theory of truth is I think irrelevant to Kant's notion of a science or recent shaft. And of course in the case of particular sciences such as physics, a lot more is required. According to Kant, physics is only a true science insofar as it rests on mathematics. So it has to be able to objectify contents in a scientific manner.

And in the case of physics, it requires the needs to quantify the findings. And so the physics needs to rely on mathematical principles in order to be able to quantify its results. But this is a requirement, this is a requirement in my view that is specific to physics. It's not a requirement that must be met in all sciences. And so I think that Kant has a loose notion of science, which allows him maybe two things, first of all to distinguish as it were, non-scientific types of metaphysics from a properly scientific metaphysics. And it also allows him to think about the specific requirements that must be met in the specific sciences. Does that make sense?

 

Speaker 1:

No. It does, that's helpful. I think one of the things that I thought was fascinating, and you raised this point in your book is if it is a method then is critique a method that leads to scientific results it seems to have here?

 

Speaker 2:

Yeah.

 

Speaker 1:

I don't know if I summarize that right from your book.

 

Speaker 2:

I find this a very interesting and important question. So at first or at first site, we can say indeed critique leads to the possibility of developing metaphysics as a science, yes? So it's a step toward the elaboration of a scientific metaphysics. And as we just discussed, Kant never really got there, but at least we can see that this was his project. But then I think the more interesting part of your question is whether the critique which is carried out in the critique pre itself, itself already scientific.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. Yeah.

 

Speaker 2:

Because if were, if the critique pre were just the heap of thoughts or arguments loosely connected together, how can it then function as a first stepping stone towards a scientific metaphysics.

 

Speaker 1:

And how can he criticize Wolf?

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. If he cannot meet the requirements of any scientific endeavor. That he establishes within the critique of, so this is I think an extremely important question. And what is very interesting is that Kant's successors, including Maiman and Ryan hold and Festar and Simone and so on, they all felt that Kant was lacking in this respect. So they felt that the critique of pure region itself did not meet its own requirements for scientificity.

 

Speaker 1:

Interesting.

 

Speaker 2:

And so they challenged Kant in this regards or rejected the critical reason in some cases, and this allowed them also to present their own philosophies as an improvement in this regard. Yes. So for instance, Ronald and Fester, they claimed that Kant was perfectly right with regard to everything he had said in the critique reason. However, he had not been able, according to them, to present his insights in a properly scientific manner. Yes, it is, to say not in a properly systematic manner.

 

Speaker 1:

Interesting.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. Very interesting.

 

Speaker 1:

Yeah, no, fascinating.

 

Speaker 2:

However, what I am doing at the moment is working on the question, well is there maybe a certain system to Kant's own critique of reason.

 

Speaker 1:

Ah, interesting.

 

Speaker 2:

So is there maybe a certain scientific and systematicity throughout [inaudible 00:39:28] reason that was not sufficiently acknowledged by Rhino and Fester and also others. Clearly the method or the methods that they use to develop their systems is very different from Kant's, yes? And Fester is the first to recognize this, but it doesn't mean that there is no systematicity to the critic reason at all. So I think that what could be done by commentators today is to try to look at the systematicity that as it were allowed to organize the various parts of the critique.

 

Speaker 1:

Go ahead, sorry about that.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes. And I think that this, looking at as it were, the systematicity of the critique of reason itself requires that we adopt this rather loose notion of scientificity that I just mentioned. Because it's clear that otherwise you can only infer that the critique of your reason is not itself scientific. To think about a notion of scientificity that can apply both to what Kant himself does in a critical reason and can also apply to the future metaphysical system that he had in mind.

 

Speaker 1:

Right. Now it's fascinating. And then my synapses are firing and I have about 75 questions, but unfortunately we're out of time. Thank you so much. The book is Cons Reform of Metaphysics by Karen Delore, Cons Reform of Metaphysics, the Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered. Look forward to talking to you about that next book. Thanks very much for talking with me.

 

Speaker 2:

Yes, thank you very much for this conversation. And it's true. I'd like to be re-invited in a couple of years.

 

Speaker 1:

Let's do it. Excellent. All right. Thanks very much. Bye-bye.

 

Speaker 2:

Bye. Bye.